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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The jurisdiction of this Court is based upon U.C.A. Section 78-2a-3(2)(h) (Supp.
1996): "appealsfromthe district court involving domestic relations cases, including, but not
limited to, divorce, annulment, property division, child custody, support, visitation, adoption,
and paternity."
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
Did the trial court abuse its discretion, thereby violating appellants' Laura Fluhman,
Paige Parsons, and Sidney Laken Fluhman (Fluhmans) due process rights, by failing to
provide them with timely notice that adequately informed the Fluhmans regarding the issues
to be heard at trial, when the trial was expanded beyond the scope of appellee's, Timothy
D. Sanchez (Sanchez), complaint forfraudulentadoption to include a trial on the issue of
compliance with the Utah Adoption Statute?
Did the trial court err, as a matter of law, in concluding that appellant Paige Parsons'
(Parsons)finalizedadoption of Sidney was not perfected as pertaining to Sanchez?
Did the trial court err, as a matter of law, in concluding that placement for adoption
does not occur until an action for adoption has been filed in the appropriate venue?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The issues presented herein are questions of law and statutory interpretation. Utah
appellate courts have consistently held that questions of law, including adoption law, are
1

reviewed for correctness without deference to the trial court's conclusions. Matter of
Adoption of W., 904 P.2d 1113,1116 (Utah App. 1995), State in Interest of H.J., 986 P.2d
115,120 (Utah App. 1999), State v. Rawlings, 893 P.2d 1063, 1066 (Utah App. 1995).
AUTHORITIES OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE
Fluhmans submit that the precedents of State in the Interest of H.J., 986 P.2d 115
(Utah App. 1999) and State Ex Rel. M.W. 970 P.2d 284 (Utah App. 1998) are of central
importance in disposing of the due process (lack of notice) claim presented herein.
Fluhmans also refer the court to In Re Adoption of B.B.D., 984 P.2d 967 (Utah
1999), and Matter of K.B.E., 740 P.2d 292 as having bearing on the issue presented herein
concerning perfection of Sidney's adoption as against Sanchez. The Utah adoption code,
CA §§78-30-1 et seq. (1996) is also applicable, particularly sections 4.12-4.16.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This proceeding was commenced in the Second Judicial District Court for the State
of Utah. Sanchez's complaint only alleged that Parsons' adoption of Sidney was fraudulent
and that it was pursued for the purpose of depriving Sanchez of his parental rights. The
Honorable Thomas L. Kay found that Parsons' adoption of Sidney, in probate number
982700016AD, was not perfected as to Sanchez. Judge Kay held that "Placement" means
having non-custodial parties on notice that an adoption is proceeding and concluded that
Sidney was "placed for adoption" within the meaning of the law after she was at least six
2

(6) months old. In reaching this conclusion the trial court held that Sidney was "placed for
adoption" when Parsons' petition for adoption was transferred to the Second District court
in case number 982700016.
This case is an appeal of the trial court's final decision.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant, Laura Fluhman (Laura), is the adult natural daughter of Paige Parsons
(Parsons). Sidney Laken Fluhman (Sidney), a minor, is Laura's natural daughter. Sidney
was born on March 26, 1997. On February 9, 1998, in the Utah Second District Court,
probate number 982700016, Parsons adopted Sidney and the adoption became final on that
date. The adoption gave Parsons the sole custody of Sidney. All three appellants, Laura,
Parsons and Sidney live together in Parsons home. Laura has diabetes and other health
problems that currently prevent herfromworking.
In 1996, Laura and Sanchez were involved in a sexual relationship. During the
course of the relationship between Sanchez and Laura, she became pregnant. At all times
during the pregnancy and at least until Sidney's birth, Sanchez was married, to someone
(not Laura). It is uncontested that Sidney was Sanchez's natural daughter.
At the time of Sidney's birth, Laura and Sanchez were drifting apart. They did not
intend, nor where they going to marry. In fact, on the weekend after Sidney's birth Sanchez
went on vacation with his wife.

3

Prior to Sidney's birth, Sanchez and Laura discussed the baby's future. They
discussed whether the child would have Sanchez's surname on the birth certificate. Prior
to Sidney's birth, Laura informed Sanchez that he would not be listed as the father on the
baby's birth certificate and that the baby would not be given the Sanchez surname.
Laura and Sanchez also discussed insurance issues regarding the baby. Prior to
Sidney's birth, Sanchez offered to put the baby on the health insurance he carried through
his employment. However, Laura refused this offer.
Laura's pregnancy with Sidney was considered high risk due to problems associated
with diabetes and high blood pressure. Both parties knew, despite the baby, they would not
be together after Sidney was bom. In order to avoid any stressful confrontations with
Sanchez, Laura registered under an assumed name when she checked into the hospital to
deliver Sidney. Sidney's birth was also registered on hospital records under an assumed
name.
Sidney was born three weeks premature and kept in the neonatal intensive care unit
(NICU) at the University of Utah Medical Center (Hospital). As consequence of her
premature birth, Sidney remained at the Hospital NICU for a period of time after Laura was
released to go home. Sidney was bora on a Wednesday. The following Sunday, after her
releasefromthe Hospital, Laura contacted Sanchez and talked to him about Sidney's birth.
Sanchez had previously been informed about Sidney's birth by his wife.

4

Previous to the above-referenced conversation with Laura, Sanchez attempted to visit
the child at the Hospital. However, because Sidney was on Hospital records under an
assumed name, the staff refused him the right to visit with the baby. After Sanchez and
Laura talked on the Sunday subsequent to Sidney's birth, Laura arranged for Sanchez to
have visitation with the baby while Sidney was still at the Hospital. After Sidney's release
from the Hospital in April 1997, Sanchez continued to visit Sidney at the Fluhmans' home.
On average, Sanchez visited Sidney at the Fluhman's home twice a monthfromApril 1997
until August 1998.
Subsequent to Sidney' s birth, Sanchez began making child support payments to Laura
in the approximate amount of $165 per month, commencing April 1997 and continuing
thereafter until December 1997. In December 1997 Sanchez increased his child support
payments by approximately $ 10.00. Sanchez made child support payments of approximately
$ 175 in December 1997 and in January 1998. The Flumans did not ask or demand, formally
or informally, that Sanchez pay child support for Sidney. At all times, Sanchez unilaterally
determined the amount of child support he paid and voluntarily made the payments.
In April 1997 with Laura's consent, Parsons retained an attorney, Keith Eddington,
to arrange for the adoption of Sidney by Parsons. On April 21,1997 when Sidney was less
than one month old, Mr. Eddington filed a petition for the adoption of Sidney by Parsons.
5

The petition for adoption filed on Parsons' behalf included a consent to adopt signed by
Laura. As a result of a misunderstanding by Mr. Eddington, he filed the adoption petition
in the Third District Court, Salt Lake County, case no. 972900190 AD instead of the Second
District Court, Davis County, where Parsons and Sidney resided.
On January 12,1998 Mr. Eddington filed a Motion for Change of Venue with regard
to Parsons' petition for the adoption of Sidney. The motion was granted and the adoption
case was transferred to the Utah Second District, Davis County. Parsons' petition for
adoption was granted by the Second District Court, Davis County, State of Utah and a
Decree of Adoption was entered on case no. 98270016 in February 1998 as previously
noted. Sanchez was not notified that Parsons was adopting Sidney before the Decree of
Adoption was entered. At the time the adoption was finalized, Sidney was under 11 months
old.
In February 1998 Sanchez was informed that Parsons had adopted Sidney. In
February 1998 Parsons and Laura also refused to accept any additional child support
paymentsfromSanchez. However, Parsons continued to permit visitation between Sanchez
and Sidney. During Sanchez's visitation with Sidney at Parsons' home in July 1998,
Sanchez requested the right to have visitation with Sidney awayfromthe Parsons' residence.
Neither Parsons or Laura would permit Sanchez the additional visitation he requested and
Sanchez was told he would not longer be permitted to visit Sidney at Parsons' home.
6

In September 1998 Sanchez caused a complaint to be filed against the Fluhmans in
the Utah Second District Court, Davis County, through his attorney, Randy S. Ludlow. The
complaint alleged four causes of action. The first cause of action alleged that Sidney was
a minor and as such should have appointed on her behalf a Guardian Ad Litem.
Sanchez's second cause of action alleged that Parsons' adoption of Sidney was
fraudulent, demanded that the adoption be set aside, that Sanchez be deemed Sidney's
natural father, that he be given parental rights, and that Sidney be given his surname.
Sanchez's third cause of action alleged that Parsons' adoption of Sidney was
fraudulent, and demanded monetary damages resultingfromthefraudin a sum not less than
$500,000.
Sanchez's fourth cause of action allegedfraudulentinducement, i.e., that Laura made
fraudulent statements to Sanchez which Sanchez believed and relied on. The fourth cause
of action demanded general, special, punitive, and exemplary damages against Laura and
Parsons in an amount not less than $500,000.
At no time before or after the birth of Sidney and prior tofilinghis complaint against
the Fluhmans did Sanchez file an "Acknowledgment of Paternity" as to Sidney.
A bench trial was held on Sanchez's complaint on April 27, 2000 in the Utah Second
District Court, Davis County, Judge Thomas L. Kay presiding. Fluhman's were present and
7

represented by counsel, Keith Eddington. Sanchez was present and represented by counsel,
Randy Ludlow.
At trial the Fluhmans' attorney prepared for and was ready to defend against
Sanchez's complaint forfraudulentadoption. However, at trial, over Fluhmans9 objections
and with the consent of Sanchez, the court did not reach a decision based on Sanchez's
claim offraudulentadoption. Effectively, but not specifically, the court allowed Sanchez
to amend his complaint, present evidence, and seek relief based on allegations that in
adopting Sidney, Parsons' failed to comply with Utah adoption law.
The trial court found that Sidney was placed for adoption after she was at least six
months old. The court found that placement occurred when the Parsons' petition was
transferred to the Utah Second District Court, Davis County. Accordingly, the court found
and awarded judgment to Sanchez on the sole basis that Parsons' adoption of Sidney was
not perfected as to Sanchez because Parsons failed to comply with the requirements of Utah
adoption law.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
By effectively allowing Sanchez to amend his complaint at trial and seek relief based
on allegations that Parsons' adoption of Sidney failed to comply with Utah adoption law, the
court violated Fluhmans' due process rights to notice regarding the adjudicated at trial.
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Under Utah's adoption statutes and applicable case law, the trial court erred in
defining placement to mean when Parsons' Petition for Adoption was filed in the proper
venue.
As a matter of law, under U.C.A. §§78-30-4.12-4.16, the trial court erred in setting
aside the final adoption decree entered on Sidney's adoption by Parsons.
ARGUMENT
I.

THIS COURT SHOULD OVERTURN THE TRIAL COURT'S
DECISION BASED ON ITS FAILURE TO PROTECT THE
FLUHMANS' DUE PROCESS RIGHTS TO NOTICE.
Utah appellate courts have consistently held "due process requires timely notice

which adequately informs the parties of the specific issues they must prepare to meet." State
Ex Rel. M.W., 970 P.2d 284,294 (Utah App. 1998). State In Interest of H.J., 986 P.2d 115,
126 (Utah App. 1999) reaffirmed due process notice requirements. H.J. involved an appeal
by the grandmother of three children from the dismissal of her adoption petition in juvenile
court.
The grandmother filed a motion in juvenile court for temporary custody of the
children. This motion wasfiledand heard before the natural mother's parental rights were
terminated. After an evidentiary hearing, the grandmother's motion for temporary custody
was denied.
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Subsequently, the state filed a motion to terminate the natural mother's parental
rights. Prior to a hearing on the state's termination of parental rights motion, the
grandmother filed an adoption petition. After a hearing resulting in termination of the
natural mother's parental rights, the state filed a motion to dismiss the grandmother's
adoption petition. Without an evidentiary hearing, the state's motion to dismiss the adoption
petition was granted. The juvenile court found that the evidentiary hearing on the
grandmother's motion for temporary custody settled all of the custody matters as pertaining
to the grandmother.
On appeal, this court reversed the juvenile court's dismissal of the adoption petition
and remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing on the merits of the grandmother's
petition. Id. at 127. The court concluded that the grandmother had no notice that a single
evidentiary hearing for the purpose resolving a specific motion, would also resolve other
issues including the question of fitness for adoption. Id. at 126.
In H.J. the court noted that for purposes of judicial economy, the juvenile court had
apparently attempted to adapt a hearing held for one specific purpose to another. However,
the court quoted approvinglyfromits decision in A.E. v Christean, 938 P.2d 811,816 (Utah
App. 1997) affirming its position that "Judicial economy cannot justify the double use of
hearings when the purpose behind the hearings involves different issues of fact and law.
H.J. id. at 125.

10

Similarly, in the case now before this court, Sanchez filed a complaint against the
Fluhmans alleging fraud and fraudulent inducement. Nowhere in the complaint or any
amendments, did Sanchez state a claim for relief based on failure to comply with Utah
adoption law. In fact, it is arguable that Sanchez purposefully avoided bringing his cause
of action under Utah adoption law because U.C.A. §78-30-4.15(2) specifically provides that
fraudulent representations cannot be a basis for vacation of an adoption decree.
U.C.A. §78-30-4.15(2) provides: Any person injured by fraudulent representations
or actions in connection with an adoption is entitled to pursue civil or criminal penalties in
accordance with existing law. A fraudulent representation is not a defense to strict
compliance with the requirements of this chapter, and is not a basis for dismissal of a
petition for adoption, vacation of an adoption decree or an automatic grant of custody to the
offended party.... Based on this statute, the Fluhmans moved the trial court to dismiss
Sanchez's complaint. However at a hearing on February 11, 1999 the court denied
Fluhmans' motion, stating its preference to hear Sanchez's evidence at trial and render a
decision based on the facts of the case.
It is essential to note, at the hearing on Fluhmans' motion to dismiss, the parties and
the court discussed the effect of Utah adoption statutes and case law on Sanchez's case.
However, even after the hearing, Sanchez did not amend his complaint to state a cause of
action under Utah's adoption statutes as set forth in U.C.A. §78-30-1 et seq. At the motion
11

hearing the court also established a time for discovery and set the case for trial on April 27,
2000.
As a consequence of the court's decision on their motion and based on Sanchez's
causes of action as set forth in his pleadings, the Fluhmans prepared to defend themselves
at trial against claims of fraud andfraudulentinducement. However, at trial, commencing
with the court's opening discussions, the court determined that the Sanchez's case would
proceed under Utah Adoption law as stated in U.C.A. §78-30-1 et seq. (Trial transcript,
page 4, lines 10-25.) Further, in closing arguments Sanchez essentially abandoned his
causes of action forfraudand fraudulent inducement (Trial transcript, page 221, lines 19-25
and page 221, lines 1-12). With the court's coaching, Sanchez's case was presented and
decided under U.C.A. §78-30-4.14. (Trial transcript, page 4, lines 10-25, page 5, lines 1-25,
page 6, lines 1-12, and page 229, lines 18-23).
Allowing Sanchez to present claims for relief under adoption law materially altered
the type of case the Fluhmans were defending. A.t trial, Fluhmans were prepared to rebut
claims that they acted with the intent of defrauding Sanchez or that they fraudulently
induced Sanchez to action or inaction. However, whether the Fluhmans acted fraudulently
did not even become an issue. The entire flavor of Sanchez's complaint was modified to
reflect a claim for relief based on Parsons' failure to comply with the adoption statutes.
Under due process standards recognized in State In the Interest of H.J. and in State
12

other than those set forth in his pleadings. As a result and to their detriment the Fluhmans
were not properly prepared to defend the claims actually presented at trial or properly brief
the court on the applicable statutes and case law.
That the Fluhmans' lack of notice impeached their ability to properly prepare their
defense and created confusion in the court is exemplified by several discussions between the
court and the trial attorneys regarding U.C. A. §78-30-4.14(4). Beginning on page 223, line
14 of the trial transcript and continuing through page 231; and in particular, on page 231,
lines 16-23, the court expresses a great deal of concern about the Fluhmans' argument
regarding the applicability of U.C.A. §78-30-4.14(4). The court was agitated that the
applicability of the statute had not previously been presented and briefed to the court. Later
during the trial, the court again expressed its concern regarding the applicability of §78-304.14(4) in a discussion between the court and Sanchez's attorney (Trial transcript, page 245,
lines 8-25). And just for emphasis, the court, in rendering its decision, made this final
statement regarding subparagraph 4: "I don't know whatfour means, but I don't think that's
the applicable statute. I think the applicable statute is either 2(a) or 2(b)." (Id. at page 251,
lines 4-6) T
Of course, at this point the Fluhmans are not arguing U.C.A. §78-30-4.14(4) applied
or did not apply to the case. That issue will be dealt with later in this brief. Rather the cited
exchanges are illustrative of the confusion created in the court and the harm caused to the
13

Fluhmans, when the court effectively permitted Sanchez to amend his causes of action
without proper notice. Simply stated, the Fluhmans were not prepared nor were they
properly able to educate the court concerning the applicable legal standards by which
Sanchez's claims should be reviewed. Accordingly, the Fluhmans request that this case be
remanded to the district court for retrial.
II.

THIS COURT SHOULD OVERTURN THE TRIAL
COURT'S CONCLUSION THAT SIDNEY WAS
"PLACED FOR ADOPTION" WHEN SHE WAS AT
LEAST SIX MONTHS OLD.
The crux of Sanchez's argument at trial, under U.C. A. §78-30-4.14(1) and (2)(a), was

that Sidney was placed for adoption after she was at least six month's old. Finding in favor
of Sanchez, the trial court concluded in its Conclusions of Law, number 4: "In this action
the child was "placedfor adoption " when the child was at least six (6) months old with the
time being on approximately January 12, 1998 when the adoption was transferred to the
Second District court in case number 982700016."
The extension of Sanchez's argument and the court's conclusion was if Sidney was
placed for adoption after she was six months old, then in petitioning to adopt Sidney,
Parsons was legally required to obtain Sanchez's consent under U.C.A. §78-30-4.13 and
4.14(1) if he met the applicable substantial relationship standards in §78-30-4.14(2). The
court found in its Conclusions of Law, number 5, that Sanchez had developed a substantial
14

relationship with Sidney, as defined by §78-30-4.14(2)(a) pertaining to adoptees placed for
adoption after they are more than six months old.
Accordingly, the court effectively found that Sanchez's consent was required prior
to Parsons' adoption of Sidney per the requirements of §78-30-4.14(1). The court concluded
that because Sanchez had not been properly notified and his consent not obtained, the
adoption, as applied to his rights as Sidney's natural father, was not perfected.
The decision to reopen the adoption of Sidney as pertaining to Sanchez is in direct
conflict with Utah's statutes and case law. Particularly troubling is the court's conclusion
that the Sidney was not placed for adoption until the adoption petition was transferred to the
Second District court, when Sidney was approximately 10 months old.
It is clear from the record that the court reached this conclusion in order to render
what it viewed as an equitable decision to a sympathetic plaintiff. (Trial transcript, page 225,
lines 4-25). However, in order to reach this conclusion, the trial court ignored this court's
decision in Matter of K.B.E, 740 P.2d 292 (Utah App. 1987). The circumstances of K.B.E.
have some similarity to the issues in this case.
In K.B.E., the natural mother arranged for her grandfather to adopt her yet to be bom
child. The child is identified as T.M.E. After T.M.E. was bom, an adoption petition was
filed providing for the T.M.E.'s adoption by the grandfather. Of note, in K.B.E. the
adoption petition provided for joint custody of T.M.E. by the natural mother and her
grandfather. The natural mother filed the adoption petition on the morning of T.M.E.'s
15

birth. The natural father filed an acknowledgment of paternity on the afternoon of the
child's birth. Id. at 293.
The issue this court decided in K.B.E. concerned whether the natural father's failure
to file an acknowledgment of paternity prior thefilingof a petition for adoption prevented
himfromcontesting T.M.E. 's adoption. In a concurring opinion, Justice Jackson urged this
court to hold (under the previous Utah adoption statutes replaced by U.C.A. §§78-30-1 et
seq. (1995)), where the natural mother intended to maintain a parent-child relationship with
T.M.E. after the adoption, the natural mother had not relinquished or placed the chiM within
the meaning of the statute that prohibited a natural fatherfromcontesting an adoption where
he failed tofilean acknowledgment of paternity prior thefilingof the petition for adoption.
Id. at 298.
However, this court specifically rejected the rational urged by Justice Jackson. Id.
at 295-296. While the court in K.B.E. granted the natural father judicial relief, it did so
under a due process rational and on the basis that "the time lapse betweenfilingthe petition
for adoption and filing the acknowledgment of paternity was so short that it demands the
intervention of the equitable power of the court." Id. at 297. The reasoning behind the
court's decision to reject the concurring opinion in K.B.E. extends to this case. First the
court declined to imply a meaning to the term "placement" in place of legislative
prerogative. Id. at 295. The court also recognized that the term placement was not defined
in the statute or by law. Id. at 295. The court accepted the clear meaning of the law, holding
16

that the natural father failed to timely file his acknowledgment of paternity and even though
the placement did not materially affect the relationship between T.M.E. and his natural
mother. Id. at 295. Finally, the court stated that "This Court should not substitute its
judgment for that of the legislature when it is not necessary to do so." Id. at 296.
In the case at issue, the turning point of Sanchez's claim and the trial court's decision
was that Sidney was not placed for adoption before she was six months old. The court
found that placement did not occur until the misfiled adoption petition was moved to the
proper venue within the Second District court. However, nowhere in Utah's statutes dealing
with adoption or in the associated case law is there any language to support trial court's
conclusion that placement did not occur until the adoption petition was filed in the
appropriate venue. Utah adoption law simply does not equate placement with thefilingof
an adoption petition.
In K.B.E., supra, this court specifically declined to hold adoptions, where the natural
mother maintains a relationship with the adoptee, to a different notice and consent standard
absent legislative intent. Id. at 295. Likewise in Matter of Adoption of C.M.G., 869 P.2d 997
(Utah App. 1994) this court had a similar opportunity to again create a different notice and
consent standard for adoptions where the natural mother maintains a relationship with the
adoptee. In declining to create a new standard, this court recognized its decision in K.B.E.
Footnote 2 of the opinion notes, under the doctrine of stare decisis, the court's decision in
K.B.E. precluded itfromfinding a different standard for these types of adoptions. Id. at 999.
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In this case, Fluhmans maintain that Sidney was placed with her adoptive parent at
the very instant that Laura and Parsons decided that Parsons adoption of Sidney was
appropriate - shortly after Sidney was releasedfromthe Hospital in April 1997. At the very
latest, Sidney was placed for adoption with Parsons when Laura signed a "consent to adopt"
and Parsons' petition was inadvertently filed in the Third District court on 21 April 1997.
The Fluhmans take this position not on the basis that an adoption petition was filed, but
because the filed petition is a non-arbitrary, verifiable manifestation that Laura placed
Sidney for adoption with Parsons in April 1997.
It should be noted, regarding the nature of consent, U.C.A. §78-30-4.20 provides: "A
consent or relinquishment is effective when it is signed and may not be revoked."
Because the evidence is clear that Laura signed a consent to adopt, which was filed
in the Third District Court along with Parsons Adoption Petition, this court should overturn
the trial court and hold that placement occurred when Laura and Parsons demonstrated their
intent that Parsons adopt Sidney.
III.

IF THIS COURT FINDS THAT SIDNEY WAS PLACED
FOR ADOPTION BEFORE SHE WAS SIX MONTHS OLD,
THEN THE COURT SHOULD ALSO HOLD THAT
APPLICATION U.C.A.§78-30-4.14(2)(B) GOVERNS SANCHEZ'S
RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES WITH REGARD TO HER
ADOPTION.
If Sidney was placed for adoption prior six months of age, then the operative statute

with regard to the necessity of Sanchez's consent is U.C.A.§78-30-4.14(l)(f) and (2)(b).

18

Subsection 1(f) provides: (I) Either relinquishmentfor adoption to a licensed child-placing
agency or consent to adoption is requiredfrom: ...(f) an unmarried biological father of an
adoptee, as defined in Section 78-30-4.11, only if the requirements and conditions of
Subsection (2) (a) or (b) have been proven;
Subsection 2(b) provides as follows:
"With regard to a child who is under six months of age at the time he is placed with
adoptive parents, an unmarried biologicalfather shall have manifested a full commitment
to his parental responsibilities by performing all of the acts described in this subsection
prior to the time the mother executes her consent for adoption or relinquishes the child to
a licensed child-placing agency. The father shall:
(i) initiate proceedings to establish paternity under Title 78, Chapter 45a, Uniform
Act on Paternity, andfile with that court a sworn affidavit stating that he is fully able and
willing to have full custody of the child, setting forth his plans for care of the child, and
agreeing to a court order of child support and the payment of expenses incurred in
connection with the mother's pregnancy and the child's birth;
(ii) file notice of the commencement of paternity proceedings with the state registrar
of vital statistics within the Department of Health, in a confidential registry established by
the department for that purpose; and
(Hi) if he had actual knowledge of the pregnancy, paid afair and reasonable amount
of the expenses incurred in connection with the mother's pregnancy and the child's birth, in
19

accordance with his means, and when not prevented from doing so by the person or
authorized agency having lawful custody of the child."
It cannot be disputed if this court holds as a matter of law that Sidney was placed for
adoption before she was six months old, then Sanchez failed to meet the requirements of
Subsection 2(b). Strict compliance with all Subsection 2(b) requirements was necessary to
preserve his parental rights with regard to Sidney. Conversely, Sanchez did not initiate
proceedings to establish paternity as required by Subsection 2(b)(i) and he did not file a
notice of the commencement of paternity with the state registrar as required by Subsection
2(b)(ii).
As a result of Sanchez's failure to comply with Subsection 2(b), his consent for
Sidney's adoption was not required. In a recent Utah Supreme Court decision, In Re
Adoption of B.B.D., 984 P.2d 967 (Utah 1999) the court made clear, under U.C.A. §§78-304.12, 4.13, and 4.14, where an unmarried father fails to take the legal steps necessary to
establish paternity, he forfeits his parental righls and is deemed to have "waived and
surrendered any right in relation to the child, including the right to notice...and his consent
to the adoption is not required." Id. at 970-971.
Under In Re Adoption of B.B.D., Id., when Sanchez failed to take actions necessary
to establish paternity, he forfeited any right he might have had to notice and consent under
Sidney's adoption. Accordingly, Fluhmans request that this court set aside the trial court's
decree providing that Sidney's adoption is not perfected as to Sanchez.
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IV.

U.C.A. §78-30-4.14(4) PROVIDES AN ALTERNATIVE
TO OBTAINING THE CONSENT OF AN UNMARRIED
FATHER PRIOR TO AN ADOPTION.
U.C.A. §78-30-4.14(4) states:
"If there is no showing that an unmarried biological father has consented to or

waived his rights regarding a proposed adoption, the petitioner shallfilewith the court a
certificatefrom the state registrar ofvital statistics within the Department of Health, stating
that a diligent search has been made of the registry of noticesfromunmarried biological
fathers described in Subsection (2)(b)(ii), and that nofilinghas beenfoundpertaining to the
father of the child in question, or ifafilingis found, stating the name of the putative father
and the time and date of filing. That certificate shall be filed with the court prior to
entrance of a final decree of adoption."
Under this Subsection, the parties to an adoption can otherwise avoid the necessity
of providing notice to an unmarried biological father by filing a certificate from the state
registrar of vital statistics, stating that after a diligent search of the registry no filings have
been found pertaining to the child in question. In the case at issue, the Fluhmans completed
andfiledthree certificates of searches for paternity with the Utah Second District court prior
to completion of Sidney's adoption. (Trial transcript, page 232, lines 7-17.) The court in
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the adoption proceeding found that the requirements of the adoption statutes had been met
and entered a decree of adoption.
Accordingly, even if this courtfindsthat Sanchez may have had rights to notice and
consent with regard to Sidney's adoption, Fluhmans' compliance with U.C.A. §78-304.14(4) obviated the notice and consent requirements of U.C.A. §78-30-4.13 and 4.14.
Therefore, Fluhmans request this court set aside the trail court's decision that provides
Sidney's adoption was not perfected as to Sanchez and hold that the adoption is perfected
based on the Fluhmans' compliance with U.C.A. §78-30-4.14(4).
V.

UNDER U.C.A. §78-30-4.16(3) THIS COURT SHOULD
SET ASIDE THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION ON
THE BASIS THAT AN ADOPTION MAY NOT BE
CONTESTED AFTER THE FINAL DECREE IS ENTERED.
U.C.A. §78-30-4.16(1) defines the remedies a court may use when a party contests

an adoption, including the remedies available to a party entitled to notice and consent under
"the provision of this chapter..." Id. However, U.C.A. §78-30-4.16(3) expressly limits the
time period for contesting an adoption. Subsection 3 states:
An adoption may not be contested after thefinaldecree of adoption is entered.
In this case, thefinaldecree on Sidney's adoption by Parsons was entered by the Utah
Second District court on 9 February 1998. At trial, Sanchez testified that Laura told him in
February 1998 that Parsons had adopted Sidney. (Trial transcript, page 40, lines 2-11.)
However, Sanchez waited until September 1998 before filing the complaint which gave rise
to this case.

In the Utah Supreme Court decision, In Re Adoption of B.B.D., supra, the court
recognized that the state has a compelling interest in the adoption process. Id. at 970. The
court upheld the legality U.C.A. §78-30-4.12, 4.13, and 4.14 and the state's compelling
interest defining the rights of the parties to an adoption Id. at 970,971. Under U.C.A. §7830-4.12(3)(a) the state has specifically defined when an unmarried biological father's actions
are sufficiently prompt and substantial to require protection. The statute further provides
under U.C.A. §§78-30-4.12(3)(b) and (c):
"(b) If an unmarried biological fatherfails to grasp the opportunities to establish a
relationship with his child that are available to him, his biological parental interest may be
lost entirely, or greatly diminished in constitutional significance by his failure to timely
exercise it, or by his failure to strictly comply with the available legal steps to substantiate
it.
(c) A certain degree of finality is necessary in order to facilitate the state's
compelling interest The Legislature finds that the interests of the state, the mother, the
child, and the adoptive parents described in this section outweigh the interest of an
unmarried biological father who does not timely grasp the opportunity to establish and
demonstrate a relationship with his child in accordance with the requirements of this
chapter."
In this case, not only did Sanchez fail to protect his interests by complying with
requirements to establish paternity prior to Sidney's adoption, but he waited until seven
months after he was notified the adoption occurred to file an action contesting the adoption.

As a result application of U.C. A. §78-30-4.16(3) prohibits Sanchezfromcontesting Sidney's
adoption. Accordingly and on this basis, Fluhmans request this court set aside the trial court
decision that provides Sidney's adoption was not perfected as to Sanchez and hold that the
adoption is perfected under U.C.A. §78-30-4.16(3).
CONCLUSION
The trial court's decision that the adoption of Sidney by Parsons was not perfected
as to Sanchez is fatally flawed for the reasons set forth herein. From the beginning, by
bringing an action based on fraud, Sanchez failed to state a cause of action on which the
court could grant the relief he wanted - which was for the adoption to be set aside. U.C. A.
§78-30-4.15 clearly provides that all parties to an adoption are responsible for their own
actions and that fraud is not a basis for setting aside an adoption. At trial Sanchez
recognized this and attempted rehabilitate his claims under U.C.A. §78-30-4.14, arguing the
adoption should be set aside on the basis that he was entitled to notice and an opportunity
to consent.
However, Sanchez's rehabilitation of his cause of action at trial and the trial court's
decision to permit allow it, violated Fluhmans' due process right to timely notice regarding
the issues to be heard before the court. Because Fluhmans were not adequately advised
regarding the issues Sanchez would be allowed to raise at trial, the court's decision should
set aside and this case remanded for a new trial.
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Even if this court finds that Fluhmans had sufficient notice regarding :he issues
Sanchez would raise at trial, the trial court's decision should still be set aside. Under Utah
adoption law Sanchez, as an unmarried father, had statutory notice that an adoption
proceeding regarding Sidney may occur.
U.C.A. §78-30-4.13(1). The law clearly requires that unmarried fathers take
affirmative steps defined by law to protect theirrightsas to children born outside the bonds
of legal marriage. When he failed to file the appropriate acknowledgments concerning
paternity prior to the time Sidney was placed for adoption, Sanchez legally waived any
rights he might have had to notice and an opportunity to consent to the adoption.
Under the law, Laura placed Sidney for adoption when she and Parsons agreed to
proceed with the petition. In furtherance of that decision, Laura executed a consent to adopt
and Parsonsfiledan Adoption Petition in April 1997, when Sidney was less than one month
old. Under U.C.A. §78-30-4.14, in situations where a child is placed for adoption before
it is six months old, in order to protect his rights, an unmarried father must initiated
proceedings to establish paternity andfileappropriate notice with the state registrar of vital
statistics before the mother executes her consent. Under the statute, Sanchez failed to
protect his interests by filing the appropriate documents and initiating proceedings to
establish paternity. Under the law, Sanchez is strictly liable for his own actions and in
failing to protect his interests, Sanchez forfeited his right to contest Sidney's adoption.
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In the event this court finds that Sanchez did comply with the law as pertaining to his
right to receive notice and consent to Sidney's adoption, the trial court still erred in
reopening the adoption proceedings. As demonstrated herein, the state and interested parties
have a compelling interest in the finality of adoption proceedings. To achieve that end, the
state has woven several protections into its adoption statutes. U.C.A. §78-30-4.14(4)
provides, with regard to unmarried biological fathers, that a party can obviate the need for
notice and consent by filing a certificatefromthe state registrar stating that a diligent search
has been made of the registry of noticesfromunmarried biological fathers and that no filing
has been found pertaining to the father of the child in question.
In accordance with U.C.A. §78-30-4.14(4), the Fluhmans filed three such notices
with the Second District Court prior to the time the final decree of adoption was entered.
Based on the information presented, the adoption court appropriately found that adoption
was in Sidney's best interest and granted Parsons' petition. As a result, under U.C.A. §7830-4.16(3) which provides that an adoption cannot be contested after the final decree of
adoption is entered, the trial court should have barred Sanchezfromcontesting the adoption.
The Fluhmans recognize that the trial court was sympathetic to the claims raised by
Sanchez and that as presented at trial, his claims placed the court in a quandary in terms of
enforcing the letter of the law and equitable consideration. However, with regard to the law
of adoption, the trial court's sympathies were misplaced. The law clearly recognizes a need
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for finality in adoption proceedings and imposes on unmarried fathers strict requirements
which they must meet to protect their paternal interests. While during the course of his
relationship with Laura and Sidney Sanchez took some of the steps necessary to protect his
interests, he failed to meet the most significant legal requirements and in failing to do so
waived his paternal rights.
The law applicable to this case clearly establishes that Sanchez failed to comply with
the Utah adoption statutes' admittedly rigorous standards. However, consistently and most
recently in In Re Adoption of B.B.D., supra, the Utah Supreme Court and this court have
upheld Utah's adoption law. The Fluhman's request that this court do so again in this case
and grant them they relief requested herein.
DATED t h i s o ^ day of October, 2000.

RANDLE, DEAMER, McCONKIE & LEE

Kathleen McConkie
Attorney for Appellants
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Randy S. Ludlow #2011
Attorney for Petitioner
336 South 300 East, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 531-1300
Fax: (S01) 322-1628

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

TIMOTHY D SANCHEZ,

COMPLAINT

Petitioner,

CaseNo. W ? g / 5 c ^ d 5

vs.
LAURA FLUHMAN, PAIGE PARSONS,
and SIDNEY LAKEN FLUHMAN by and
through his Guardian Ad Litem,
Respondents.

COMES NOW the petitioner who complains and alleges as follows:
STATEMENT OF FACTS
"" 1. The plaintiff is a resident of Davis County, state of Utah.
-N 2, All acts in this matter occurred within Davis County, state of Utah.
•«-. 3. Sidney Laken Fluhman is a minor child born on March 26,1997.
n4. Sidney Laken Fluhman has not had a Guardian Ad Litem appointed for her.
5. The plaintiff is the natural father of Sidney Lake Fluhman.

[

6. Laura Fluhman is the natural mother of Sidney Laken Fluhman!
*7, Paige Parsons is the natural mother of Laura Fluhman,
8. The plaintiff and Laura Fluhman had become involved in a relationship that resulted in
Laura Fluhman becoming pregnant.
^

9. After Laura Fluhman became pregnant the plaintiff commenced paying to her $100 per

month for aid and support during her pregnancy.
^ i 0, Laura Fluhman had always informed the plaintiff that he would be involved in the child's
life upon the birth of the child and that the two parties had made arrangements for the natural mother
to call plaintiff when the deliver)' of the birth of the child was eminent and to thereafter act in all
respects as the natural father to the child and the child would be given his surname of Sanchez upon
I Us birth.

I
J

N

-' 1L At the time of the birth of the child Laura Fluhman did not inform the plaintiff that the

Ichild was in fact born and he was informed of the birth by a third person and upon that information
I went to the University of Utah Medical Center to see and observe the child.
I

r

12. Upon arrival at the University of Utah Medical Center the plaintiff was informed that the

Ichild was not located there when the child was in feet at that location but said hospital had been
Informed by Laura Fluhman not to inform the plaintiff of the birth of the child nor to allow him to see
lithe child.
it
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" ~ 13. Upon attendance at the University Hospital the plaintiff had informed the staff at said
hospital that he was at that center in order to see his child and to see if he was in fact on the birth
certificate for the child and was after informed that the child was not located there by said staflf based
upon statements and requests that had been made by Laura Fiuhman to hospital personnel.
14. The plaintiff did not put his name on the birth certificate nor on an acknowledgment of
[paternity based upon the statements as made to him by hospital personnel,
O 15. The plaintiff would have put his name on the birth certificate but for the actions taken by
he defendant, Laura Fiuhman, and her statements to hospital personnel.
-. 16, Subsequent to the child's birth the plaintiff thereafter was informed b\ Laura Fiuhman
fcat she would allow visitation and he commenced visiting the child and has continued to visit the
ifhild continuously thereafter
-

17. The child, Sidney Laken Fiuhman, was born on March 26, 1997.

> ' 18. Since the birth of Sidney Laken Fiuhman the plaintiff has paid to Laura Fiuhman child
sfipport in the s&ira of $175 per month until February 1998
fv 19. In February 1998 the plaintiff was informed that Laura Fiuhman had had the child
a|opted by her mother, Paige Parsons.
-

20. Laura Fiuhman had informed the plaintiff that the reason for the adoption by Paige

Persons of Sidney Laken Fiuhman was for insurance purposes.
i*
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21. The piaintiffhad informed Laura Fiuhman at all times that he had insurance coverage on

behalf of the child and that insurance coverage was not necessary.
\ "^s

'22, The plaintiff has been infonned by Laura Fiuhman since the time that she had the child

^adopted by Paige Parsons that Laura Fiuhman is in fact acting as the natural mother for the child,
attending the child, taking care of the child and further informing him that when she manies that she
intends to thereafter have the child adopted back to her and her then husband.
23. At all times in this matter Paige Parsons and Laura Fiuhman have acted together and
conspired with one another in order to prohibit and restrict the plajntiffs rights to Sidney Laken
Fiuhman.
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
y 24. The plaintiff incorporates paragraphs I through 23 as though fully set forth herein,
]/

25. The minor child, Sidney Laken Fiuhman should have appointed a Guardian Ad Litem in

his behalf
2s

26. The Guardian Ad Litem that is to be appointed for him should be a person other than

[either of the other defendants and should be an individual from the Guardian Ad Litem program of
Ithe Second District Court.
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
J?

27. The plaintiff incorporates paragraphs 1 through 26 as though fully set forth herein.
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' j 28. The plaintiff at all times intended to act as the natural father for Sidney Laken Fluhman
and has acted as the natural father for Sidney Laken Fluhiman.
V 29. The defendants Laura Fluhman and Paige Parsons have accomplished an adoption which
adoption isfraudulentwith no real purpose other than to prohibit the plaintifffromhaving his parental
rights with Sidney Laken Fluhman.
J

~y 30, The defendants, Laura Fluhman and Paige Parsons, conspired with one another to

Jfraudulently and/or wrongfully adopt Sidney Laken Fluhman to Paige Parsons
]?31.

Said adoption is in fact a sham with no real purpose other than to prohibit the plaintiff

Jrom acting as the natural father to Sidney Laken Fluhman.
y 32. The adoption of Sidney Laken Fluhman to Paige Parsons should be set aside and declared
fo be a nulity.
[/ 33. Upon the adoption of Sidney Laken Fluhman to Paige Parsons being set aside that the
Jlaintiff thereafter would be deemed as being the natural father of said child and given all rights,
jjrivileges and responsibilities as a natural parent together with being allowed appropriate visitation
tf> said child as provided pursuant to statute.
y 34, Upon the setting aside of the adoption the child, Sidney Laken Fluhman, would be given
te surname of the petitioner,
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
J ) 35. The plaintiff incorporates paragraphs 1 through 34 as though fully set forth herein.
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y 36. In the alternative that the court does not set aside the adoption that the plaintiff be
awarded the judgement against Laura Fluhman and Paige Parsons in a sum of not less than $500,000
for special and general damages together with punitive and exemplary damages as deemed
appropriate based upon theirfraudulentand wrongful acts and conspiring to wrongftilly prohibit and
terminate hisrightsas a parent to Sidney Laken Fluhman
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION
/ 37, The plaintiff incorporates paragraphs 1 through 36 as though fully set forth herein.
y 38. The statements as made by Laura Fluhman that she would allow the plaintiff to be the
natural father and act in all respects as the natural parent to Sidney Laken Fluhman, were statements
[which werefraudulentat the time the statements were made to plaintiff
I

y 39. The statements as made by Laura Fluhman to the plaintiff were done for the sole purpose

jof inducing him to take a course of action whereby he would not file pleadings to be declared the
child's father and/or misleading him to not enter into documents to make claims as being the natural
parent of Sidney Lake Fluhman.
t

- P 40. Said statements were falsely made at the time that they were made with the sole purpose

of inducing him to rely upon said statements.
I J ? 41. But for the statements as made by Laura Fluhman the plaintiff would have taken
appropriate action to have him declared to be the natural father of Sidney Laken Fluhman.
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D 42, The plaintiff relied to his detriment upon the statements as made by Laura Fluhman to
him.

p

43. The statements were misleading andfraudulentlymade for the intent that he would rely

Lpon the statements to his detriment,
7> 44, Because of the statements as made by Laura Fluhman to him he has now been damaged
^ 45, Paige Parsons conspired with Laura Fluhman to take the course of action above in order
[o prohibit the plaintiff from being the natural father to Sidney Laken Fluhman.
[

J? 46 The plaintiffshould be awarded general and special damages plus punitive and exemplary

damages against the defendants, Laura Fluhman and Paige Parsons in the sum of not less than
1500,000 or what other additional sums the court deems to be appropriate and just in this matter.
[

WHEREFORE, the plaintiff prays for judgement as follows:
1. For the court to appoint a Guardian Ad Litem for Sidney Laken Fluhman and to have the

stime from the Guardian Ad Litem program under the First Cause of Action.
I

2. To set aside the adoption of Sidney Laken Fluhman and to have the plaintiff declared to

bl the natural father of Sidney Laken Fluhman with him awarded ail rights, titles and obligations as
vjfculd be appropriate for a natural father including the requirements ofpaying support, visitation and
alike under the Second Cause of Action
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3. For judgement against the defendants Laura Fluhman and Paige Parsons for the wrongful
adoption in the sum of $500,000 together with what other punitive and exemplary damages the coun
Jdeems appropriate and just under the Third Cause of Action.
4. For the sum of $500,000 together with what other punitive and exemplary damages the
|:ourt deems appropriate and just under the Fourth Cause of Action.
5. For all attorneys fees incurred herein and any and all other additional relief the court would
j|eem appropriate and just in this matter.
DATED this

(\

day of September, 1998

BJU^\^l)DLbW
Attorney t^uElaintifF
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RahdyS. Ludlow #2011
Attorney lor Petitioner
331 South 300 East, Suite 200
Sal Lake City, Utah 841II
Tefcphone: (801) 531-1300
Fa* (801) 322-1628
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
DAVIS COUNTY. STATE OF UTAH

TTNJOTHY SANCHEZ,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Petitioner,

vs.

CaseNo.984701550CS

LAURA FLUHMAN, PAIGE PARSONS,
and f IDNHY LAKEN FLUHMAN,

Judge Thomas L Kay

Respondent.

THE ABOVE ENTITLED MATTER came on for trial on the 27* day of April, 1999. The
petitioner was present and represented by his attorney of record, Randy S. Ludlow. The respondents,
Lauri Ftuhman and Patricia Paige Parsons were present and represented by their attorney of record,
KeitH E. Eddmgton. The court having taken testimony together with' receiving exhibits from the
parties, the court having previously hadfiledmemorandums and based upon such and for good cause
appearing herein the court makes these its

« «e*d
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FINDINGS OF FACT
1. All parties in this matter are and were at all times residents of Davis County.
2. The petitioner and Laura Fluhman had. a sexual relationship.
3. As a result of the sexual relationship between petitioner and Laura Fluhman the parties had
bo$i to them a child, to wit: Sidney Liken Fluhman who was bora on March 26.1997.
44 The petitioner went to the hospital where the child was bom in order to see the child and
to ^rtenmne what was necessary in order to have him deemed As the father of the child.
5. Upon going to the hospital the petitioner was informed that the child was not there by the
|ital staff based on information given to the staff by Laura Fluhman.
6. The petitioner thereafter was able to see the child at the hospital.
7. After the child was born the petitioner began to visit with the child and he commenced
maldfig child support payments.
8. Prior to the birth of the child the petitioner had given some monies to the respondent,
Lauri Fluhman.
t 9. The petitioner continued to give to Laura Fluhman child support in the amount of
apprtkimatdy $165.00 per month commencing April 1997 whichTie increased to $175.00 in
December 1997 and continued thereafter in until he went to make the February 1998 payment which
was tiercafter refused to be accepted by the respondent, Laura Fluhmaa It was at this time that she
infonted the petitioner of the adoption of her child by Paige Parsons (aka Patricia Paige Parsons).
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10. Paige Parsons is the mother of Laura Fluhman and is the grandmother of Sidney Laken
Ffchman,
11. Before coronwKing the child supponpaym
thi America First Credit Union account of Latin Fluhman prior to the child's birth. He also
purchased various herns for the baby including clothing, book; changing table, diapers, toys and other
taps for and on behalf of the child.
12. The petitioner had continually visited with the child since its birth and did so twice a
nujhth on average and was thereafter allowed to do the same after the adoption had occurred until
approximately August 1998.
13. On April 21,1997 the respondent, Paige Parsons, filed a petition for adoption seeking
th«| adoption of Sidney Fluhman which petition was filed in the Third District Court, Salt Lake
Copxity, in case no. 972900190AD.
14. Patricia Paige Parsons, respondent herein, was a resident of Davis County as was the
chifl at the time of the filing of the petition in Sah Lake County.
15. No actions were taken by Patricia Paige Parsons to complete the adoption or to do any
othfcr acts until such time that shefileda Motion for Ownge of Vciro
Janpary I2» 1998 which would have been approximately ten (10) months after the birth of Sidney
Laifcn Fluhmaa
16. It is not disputed that the petitioner is in fact the natural father of Sidney Laken Fluhman.
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17. No notice was sent to the petitioner or any contact made by either Laura Fluhman or

Page Parsons informing him of Paige Persons9 intent to adopt Sidney Laken Fluhman.
i

18. In February 1998t the petition seeking the adoption by Patricia Paige Paraoos of Sidney

Laken Fluhman was granted by the Second District Court, Davis County, state of Utah and a Decree
of Adoption was entered in case no. 982700016. Sidney Laken Fluhman was approximately eleven
(11} months old at the time this Decree had been entered.
19. After the adoption had occurred the petitk)nerv/a$ informed by the respondents th^
bass for the adoption was to albw Sidney Laken Fluhman to be placed on the insurance of Patricia
Paige Parsons.
20. The petitioner at alt times ha* had medi^
and pffered that insurance to Laura Fluhman and she refused it.
21. The petitioner did not file an acknowledgment of paternity in this matter.
22. The petitioner had in feet developed and established a relationship with the minor child
prion to being prohibited from continuing with that relationship by the respondents.
23. The respondent, Laura Fluhman, has health problems and it was her intent and desire that
should something happen to her as a result of her health problems tha{ the child not be raised by the
petitioner* but only be allowed to be raised by her mother Pallida Paige Parsons.
24. Since the birth of the child the child has continuously lived with the respondent Laura
Fhihman. Laura Fluhman takes care of the child each day including the preparation of the child's
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5. The petitioner had developed a substantial relationship with the child in view of the child's
agi The petitioner had visited with the child at least monthly. The petitioner had taken a measure
ofresponsibilityto provide for the child including obtaining gifts, providing money to the natural
mother, support payments and monies given during the natural mother's pregnancy. The petitioner
hail demonstrated a full commitment to the child and was willing to do even more than he hid
previously given to the child. He spent time with the child under the restrictions and prohibitions as
put;|ipon him by the respondents.
6. Because the respondent, Laura Fhihman,^
plaJcmetf has never been such as to put the peth
statfte. "Placement" means having the person on notice Uwrt something has occuned. In this action
notffng has occurred that could be seen or deemed as ptaciing the petitioner on notice that the child
waifplaced for adoption11.
7. The adoption in probate number 982700016AD on February 9,1998 is not perfected as
to tlfe petitioner.
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ADDENDUM "3"

4

THE COURT: OKAY. UNDER THE CASES THAT ARE
IMPOSSIBILITY EXCEPTION AND SO IS THAT APPLICABLE.
MR. EDDINGTON:

IT IS NOT.

THE COURT: WHAT ABOUT THE DUE PROCESS?
MR. EDDINGTON:

THE DUE PROCESS, IF YOU

WANT TO

ADDRESS THAT FOR A MINUTE, I'D BE HAPPY TO ADDRESS THAT.
HIS DUE PROCESS CLAIM HAS BEEN RAISED MANY OTHER TIMES.
BASICALLY WHAT THE COURTS HAVE RULED IS THAT THERE IS NO
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT UNLESS AND UNTIL HE HAS MET THE BURDEN,
ESTABLISHED THE RELATIONSHIP, DONE THE THINGS THAT THEY
REQUIRED IN THE STATUTE BEFORE THERE'S A CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHT TO EVEN PROTECT. HE'S GIVEN AN INCHOATE RIGHT IS THE
WAY THEY REFER TO IN BELL TRAN. AN INCHOATE RIGHT, IN FACT
IN THE STATUTE, THAT HE NEEDS TO COMPLY WITH THE
REQUIREMENTS SET FORTH BY THE LEGISLATURE BEFORE HE EVEN HAS
AN INTEREST TO BE DENIED ANY DUE PROCESS OF. AND HE HASN'T
DONE THAT.
THE COURT:

IN THIS BELL TRAN CASE THEY REFER TO

THE CASE IN RE: ADOPTION OF BABY BOY DOE. AND IN THAT CASE
THE SUPREME COURT REVERSED FOR AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING A
PERSON WHO DIDN'T COMPLY WITH THE STATUTE BECAUSE IT SAID
THAT EVERYONE INVOLVED IN THE FATHER'S OPPOSITION TO
ADOPTION, THE FATHER WAS NOT A UTAH RESIDENT, WAS ABSENT AT
THE TIME OF THE BIRTH, THE MOTHER HAD FALSELY REPRESENTED
SHE WOULD NOT PLACE THE CHILD FOR ADOPTION AND HER FAMILY

1

HAD DELIBERATELY WITHHELD INFORMATION FROM THE FATHER ABOUT

2

THE MOTHER'S PLANS FOR ADOPTION.

3

FACTS AREN'T HERE BECAUSE HE WAS A UTAH RESIDENT.

4

MR. LUDLOW:

5

THE COURT:

6

NOW, I KNOW ALL THOSE

EXACTLY.
BUT ISN'T PART OF HIS CLAIM THAT PEOPLE

FALSELY REPRESENTED THINGS TO HIM.

7

MR. LUDLOW:

HIS CLAIM ON ITS FACE IS A FRAUD

8

CLAIM.

BUT THAT CLEARLY THE STATUTE DEALS WITH THAT.

9

HAS THE BURDEN OF AVOIDING THE FRAUD.

HE

IT'S CLEARLY

.0

DIFFERENT THAN IN THE BABY DOE CASE.

.1

OF STATE.

.2

KNOW AND COMPLY WITH THE STATUTES AS THEY ARE HERE.

.3

ONLY THAT, BUT FROM THE VERY BEGINNING, EVEN BY HIS OWN

L4

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT IN HIS COMPLAINT, HE WAS AWARE OF THE BIRTH

L5

OF THE CHILD.

L6

OF NOT PLACING HIM ON THE BIRTH CERTIFICATE OR AT LEAST

L7

THAT'S WHAT HE BELIEVED BASED ON WHAT THE HOSPITAL PERSONNEL

L8

WAS TELLING HIM.

L9

WITH THE ISSUES AT THE TIME.

20

MONTHS LATER BEFORE HE FILES AN ACTION AND THEN HE FILES IF

21

AS A FRAUD ACTION.

22

HE STILL HAD NOT EVEN CLAIMED PATERNITY.

23

AND MONTHS AFTER HE WAS AWARE OF THE ADOPTION, AFTER HE WAS

24

AWARE OF THE BIRTH, THAT HE WAS NOT ON THE BIRTH

25

CERTIFICATE, EVEN GIVEN HIS FACTS WHICH WE CONTEST A

HE RESIDED HERE.

HE DID NOT RESIDE OUT

THEREFORE HE IS EXPECTED TO

HE WAS AWARE OF WHERE SHE WAS.

NOT

HE WAS AWARE

HE EASILY HAD TIME TO COMPLY AND TO DEAL
AND HERE WE ARE ALMOST 18

AS LATE AS OCTOBER WE HAVE PROOF OF THAT
MONTHS AND MONTHS

1

SUBSTANTIAL AMOUNT OF THEM, BUT EVEN GIVEN HIS FACTS, HIS

2

CASE SHOULD BE DISMISSED ON ITS FACE.

3

HAS NOT COMPLIED WITH ANY OF THE STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS.

4

THE COURT: YOU ARE CERTAIN IF IT GOT DISMISSED

THERE'S NO BASIS. HE

5

RIGHT NOW YOU'D HAVE A REALLY GOOD SLAM DUNK ON APPEAL WHERE

6

THE SUPREME COURT HAS SAID ABOUT CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES ARE

7

RAISED YOU

8
9

OUGHT TO AT LEAST HAVE AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING.

MR. EDDINGTON:

I'M CONVINCED THAT EVEN ON APPEAL

WE'D BE FINE WITH THE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES. IF WE WANT TO

10

ADDRESS SOME OF THOSE TODAY, I'D BE HAPPY TO DO THAT.

11

THE COURT: WELL, IT'S YOUR MOTION.

ALL I CAN SAY

12

IS ON A MOTION TO DISMISS THE STANDARD WITH THE SUPREME

13

COURT AND THE COURT OF APPEALS IS THAT, YOU

14

TO REVERSE THAT.

15

TRIAL IS THE BEST.

16

TO SEE THIS THING THREE TIMES.

17

THEN A YEAR AND A HALF FROM NOW THE SUPREME COURT REVERSES

18

IT SAYING THAT I SHOULD HAVE HEARD EVIDENCE BEFORE I RULED,

19

THAT'S WHAT IT GETS TO THE ISSUE.

20

KNOW, IT'S EASY

SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS A LITTLE BETTER.

THE

SO ALL I'M SAYING IS THAT I DON'T WANT

MR. EDDINGTON:

IF YOU GRANT THE MOTION AND

I MEAN, TO ME --

I SUPPOSE THAT'S WHY I HESITATED

21

WHEN YOU ASKED WHETHER IT WAS A MOTION TO DISMISS OR

22

SUMMARY JUDGMENT.

23

I'M CONFIDANT IT CAN BE HANDLED THAT WAY.

24

IS INTERESTED IN HEARING ANY EVIDENCE OR DEALING WITH IT,

25

I'D BE HAPPY TO PUT THAT EVIDENCE ON.

IT WAS BROUGHT AS A MOTION TO DISMISS AND
BUT IF THE COURT

THAT TIME PERIOD.
FRUITION.

THAT'S WHEN DOES THE ADOPTION COMES TO

I CONSIDER IT INTERESTING THAT SHE, ON THE

DOCUMENTS THAT SHE FILED AND ALSO THAT WERE FILED ON THE
PETITION, BOTH OF THEM SAY AN UNKNOWN FATHER.
JUST FLAT OUT UNTRUE.

AND THAT'S

BOTH THESE PEOPLE KNOW WHO THE FATHER

WAS.
THE COURT: WELL, AND I UNDERSTAND WHAT THE STATUTE
SAYS.

I THINK THE BETTER THING THERE IS IS THE MOTHER OF

THE CHILD SAYING HER CONSENT WAS NOT TO CUT TIM OFF. WELL,
IT DID.
MR. LUDLOW:

IT DID.

THE COURT: THAT WASN'T HER INTENT, YOU

KNOW. I

MEAN, MY QUESTION IS WHY DON'T THEY LET ANYBODY KNOW.

IT

WASN'T THAT HE WAS GOING TO GET CUSTODY OF THE CHILD. YOU
KNOW, IF HE WAS GIVEN NOTICE OF THE ADOPTION, HE WAS GOING
TO ARGUE FOR WHAT HE'S ARGUING NOW AND THAT IS THE CHANCE TO
HAVE VISITATION.
MR. LUDLOW:
THE COURT:
HAPPEN AND YOU

THAT IS ALL HE'S ARGUING, SIR.
I UNDERSTAND.

SAY, OKAY.

WHAT IF THAT DOESN'T

I FIND YOU

DON'T MEET THE

STANDARDS, THEN WHAT ARE YOU SAYING ABOUT THE OTHER CLAIMS
ABOUT DAMAGES FOR WHAT THESE PEOPLE HAVE DONE.
MR. LUDLOW:

THE STATUTE DOES SPECIFICALLY ALLOW

FOR AN ACTION TO BE MAINTAINED EVEN IF IT'S BEEN WRONGFULLY
DONE BY THEM.

THE COURT CAN AWARD MONEY DAMAGES. OUR

223

UNLESS THE FATHER WASN NECESSARY TO BE CONTACTED IN ORDER
FOR THE ADOPTION TO OCCUR. AND I THINK THAT CASE HAS THE
SAME THINGS AND ELEMENTS. WHEN YOU

TALK ABOUT WHAT'S

HAPPENING IN THIS CHILD, THE CHILD STILL BEING THERE NEVER
HAVING LITERALLY BEEN RELINQUISHED.

AND TOPPING THAT OFF

WITH WHAT WE BELIEVE THAT THE PETITIONER HAS IN FACT
ESTABLISHED A RELATIONSHIP AND DONE SO IN THE CONFINES OF
WHAT HAS BEEN REQUESTED.

THAT THE COURT SHOULD IN FACT SETD

ASIDE THE ADOPTION AND ALLOW HIM TO BE DEEMED AS BEING THE
FATHER AND GIVE HIM HIS VISITATION FOR THIS CHILD AND HE'LL
PAY THE SUPPORT.

THAT'S TRULY WHAT WE WANT.

THE COURT: WELL, LET'S HEAR FROM THE OTHER SIDE
THEN YOU'LL GET YOUR LAST OPPORTUNITY.
MR. EDDINGTON:

YOUR HONOR,

AGAIN, WE RESPECTFULLY

REPEAT THAT WE SHOULDN'T BE HERE.
THE COURT: WELL, YOU

KNOW WHAT?

IF WE SHOULDN'T

HAVE BEEN I'VE SURE WASTED ABOUT FROM 8:30 TILL FOUR TODAY
AND ALL MY LUNCH DOING NOTHING BUT READING THIS STUFF. AND
YOU

KNOW, NOT BEING ABLE TO EVEN ENJOY MY TWO PIECEES OF

BREAD I HAD TO EAT.
MR. EDDINGTON:

I UNDERSTAND THAT.

I'M SURE THAT

THE PARTIES AREN'T NECESSARILY THRILLED EITHER.

BUT MY

WHOLE POINT, I BELIEVE THAT THE ADOPTION WAS GRANTED IN
FEBRUARY OF '98.
THE COURT:

THERE IS NO QUESTION ABOUT THAT. YOU

1

MR. EDDINGTON:

I'M NOT SAYING THAT THAT IS. LET

2

ME ADDRESS THAT BECAUSE THAT'S OBVIOUSLY A CONCERN THE COURT

3

HAS.

4

THE COURT:

I'VE GOT A BIG CONCERN.

THE ONE

5

CONCERN IS I HAVE A BIOLOGICAL FATHER WHO COMES IN HERE AND

6

I HAVE CASE AFTER CASE WHERE PEOPLE DON'T WANT TO PAY CHILD

7

SUPPORT. NOW I HAVE SOMEONE VOLUNTEERINGING TO DO SO. I

8

HAVE SOMEONE WHO'S SAYING, IF I DON'T GIVE YOU WHAT YOU ASK

9

FOR, WHAT ABOUT MONEY AND THEY SAY THEY DON'T WANT MONEY.

10

YOU

KNOW, THAT'S RARE THINGS THAT I'VE HEARD. AND IF IT'S

11

STRATEGY, IT'S A GOOD ONE. BECAUSE IT'S RARE.

12

HAVE HERE IS SOMEONE SAYING THAT I DON'T WANT TO CUT OFF,

13

YOU

14

GOING TO DO IS KEEP HIM IN THE DARK; NOT LET HIM KNOW ABOUT

15

IT. AND THEN AFTER THE FACT SAY, WE GOT AN ADOPTION. I

16

MEAN, THAT'S BASICALLY WHAT I'M FACED WITH.

17

AFTER SOMETHING WAS FILED IN APRIL OF '97 THEN MOVED HERE IN

18

JANUARY OR FEBRUARY '98. THEN SOMEBODY WHO WAS LOOKING AT

19

THIS SHOULD HAVE THEN SAID, WHEW,

20

OF '98. MAYBE WE'RE GOING TO BE UNDER THE CHILD OVER TEN

21

MONTHS RULE OR CHILD OVER SIX MONTHS.

22

ARE WE GOING TO BE ABLE TO PROVE THIS OR NOT. ARE WE GOING

23

TO MAKE A CALCULATED RISK THAT WE CAN PROVE THIS AND WE'RE

24

NOT GOING TO TELL HIM ANYTHING AND THEN I CAN BRING THIS UP

25

LATER AND CHALLENGE IT AND WE'LL SEE IF WE CAN DEFEAT IT.

KNOW, THE RIGHTS OF TIM, BUT YOU

SO WHAT I

KNOW, WHAT WE'RE

ESPECIALLY

NOW WE'RE HERE IN JANUARY

SHE'S NOW TEN. THEN,

1

ARE SAYING HE DOESN'T NEED TO KNOW.

2
3

MR. EDDINGTON: UH-HUH.
THE COURT: WELL, I CAN TELL YOU

ONE THING THAT MAY

4

BE WHAT THE LEGISLATURE HAS, BUT FOR THE LAST THREE TIMES

5

THAT I'VE HAD SOMEBODY TRYING TO DO THIS IN MY COURT WHEN I

6

HAVE BEEN DOING AN ADOPTION, I BROUGHT TWO OR THREE PEOPLE

7

OUT OF PRISON WHO WERE THE BIOLOGICAL FATHERS TO CONTEST IT

8

AND LET THEM SIT HERE AND RAISE THEIR THING.

9

IT LIGHTLY. AND I KNOW A LOT OF OTHER JUDGES BASICALLY COME

I DON'T TAKE

10

IN HERE, SIGN SOME PAPERS AND TURN IT OVER.

11

HAVE ANY RECORD OF WHAT JUDGE VANWAGNEN DID OTHER THAN YOU

12

CAME IN AND DID THE -- AND HE SIGNED THE PAPERS. YOU KNOW,

13

I DON'T HAVE ANY EVIDENCE OF WHAT TOOK PLACE.

14

WHAT I'M CONCERNED ABOUT.

15

YOU CAN WALK ME THROUGH SAYING WHY THIS CAN'T HAPPEN CHAPTER

16

AND VERSE, THAT'S WHAT YOU NEED TO DO.

17

UNUSUAL SITUATION WHERE WE'VE GOT A PLAINTIFF IN THIS

18

SETTING WHO BASICALLY SAYS, BEST CASE.

19

THE CHILD AND HAVE STANDARD VISITATION AND THEN PAY CHILD

20

SUPPORT AND I DON'T WANT ANY OTHER MONEY IF I DON'T GET

21

THAT. AND I'M NOT SAYING THAT WEIGHS ANYTHING ELSE. I

22

MEAN, THAT'S COMMENDABLE, BUT IT DOESN'T MEAN THAT THAT

23

MAKES MY DECISION HE WINS BECAUSE THAT'S A COMMENDABLE

24

POSITION.

25

AND I DON'T

SO THAT'S

I MEAN, I'M CONCERNED. AND IF

BUT THIS IS AN

I WANT TO JUST SEE

SO CONVINCE ME. THAT'S WHAT WE ARE HERE FOR.

MR. EDDINGTON: ALL RIGHT.

I UNDERSTAND THE

1

MR. EDDINGTON:

WHAT IS REQUIRED BY STATUTE, AND

2

YOU

DON'T HAVE TO COMPLY WITH 2 (A). (I), IF I CAN REFER

3

THE COURT DOWN TO 78-34-14 SUBPARAGRAPH FOUR.

4

NOW SHOWING THAT AN UNMARRIED BIOLOGICAL FATHER HAS

5

CONSENTED TO OR WAIVED HIS RIGHTS REGARDING A PROPOSED

6

ADOPTION, THE PETITIONER SHALL FILE WITH THE COURT A

7

CERTIFICATE FROM THE STATE REGISTER OF VITAL STATISTICS

8

WITHIN THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH STATING THAT A DILIGENT

9

SEARCH HAS BEEN MADE OF THE REGISTRY OF NOTICE FROM AN

IF THERE'S

10

UNMARRIED BIOLOGICAL FATHER DESCRIBED IN SECTION 2 (B) (1)

11

OR 2 (B) (2). AND THAT NO FILING HAS BEEN FOUND PERTAINING

12

TO THE FATHER OF THE CHILD.

13

CUT HIM OFF.

14

THE COURT:

15

MR. EDDINGTON:

16

THE COURT:

THAT IS ALL THAT IS REQUIRED TO

FOR WHICH SITUATION.
REGARDLESS OF THE AGE OF THE CHILD.

WHY WASN'T IT ARGUED AT THE BEGINNING

L7

OF THIS CASE OR THIS SUBPARAGRAPH FOUR EVER DISCUSSED.

L8

HAVE NEVER HEARD THAT FROM YOU

L9

WHAT YOU ARE GOING UNDER.

10

AND 2 (B) .

21

FOUR IS THE THING THAT SAYS NOTWITHSTANDING 2 (A) AND 2(B)

>2

THEN WHY DO WE HAVE A 2 (A) AND 2 (B), IF FOUR APPLIES TO

>3

EVERYTHING.

>4
>5

DISCUSSED TODAY THAT THAT'S

WE'VE BEEN TALKING ABOUT 2 (A)

OR I SURE HAVE THROUGH THE ENTIRE THING.

MR. EDDINGTON:

I

AND IF

WELL, MY POINT IS IT DOESN'T MATTER

THE AGE OF THE CHILD IF A FIVE YEAR OLD -- AND MANY OF THESE

